Michael Eriksson's Blog

A Swede in Germany

Posts Tagged ‘fallacies

The fellow-traveler fallacy

with one comment

I am currently writing a shorter post on the use of the word “feminism”. As a result of my contemplations, I suggest the existence of a “fellow-traveler fallacy” (based on the originally Soviet concept of a fellow traveler and its later generalizations):

If a group of travelers take a ship from London to New York, can we assume that they share the same eventual destination? No: One might remain in New York indefinitely. Another might go back to London a week later. Yet another might take a different ship to cruise the Caribbean. Yet another might travel across the continent to Los Angeles. Yet another might move on to Anchorage. For some time, they are fellow travelers, but not because they wanted to reach the same destination: They merely had a part of the road in common, before their paths diverged.

During their time together, they might very well have enjoyed each others company, they might have helped each other, they might have even have collaborated to survive a ship-wreck. This, however, does not imply that their destinies and interests are forever bound to each other. Those who did not intend to remain in New York would have been grossly mistreated if forced to do so. The one heading for the Caribbean could hardly have been expected to be pleased about going to Anchorage instead. For the one to entrust his suit-case to the other (and not to collect it again in New York) would be silly. Etc. Even this does not directly consider the underlying reasons for the respective journey: What if the one was returning from a vacation and the other just starting his? What if one was going to a conference, another visiting a relative, and a third taking up a new position? With factors like these in the mix, even people who are fellow travelers through-out the journey might have so different objectives that grouping them together becomes misleading.

By analogy, it is a fallacy to assume that people who at some point have the same current goals and/or strive in the same current direction will continue to do so, will remain allies, can be permanently grouped together, whatnot—and, above all, to allow one of the temporary fellow travelers to permanently speak for the entire group. Similarly, if there is disagreement about methods, a status as fellow traveler is not necessarily a good thing: If the one buys a plane ticket to Cuba and the other, even for the exact same reason, forces a plane to go to Cuba at gun point, are they really the same?

An easily understood example is how the U.S. and the Soviet Union were close allies during WWII, only to become bitter enemies for the rest of the latter’s existence—they traveled together for a short span, forced by external circumstance, and then went their own, very different, ways for more than four decades. Ideologically, they were as night and day; but as long as they had a common all-important goal (i.e. defeating the Axis powers) they still fought on the same side. Those naive or uninformed enough to commit the fallacy by expecting a post-WWII friendship were severely disappointed; those who actually saw the alliance for what it was, an unnatural union of natural enemies to defeat a common enemy, were not surprised. (This is also a good example of why the saying “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” (a) is at best a semi-truth, (b) gives no guarantees once the common enemy is defeated.)

Most examples, however, are likely to be less obvious (and, therefore, more dangerous). Consider e.g. how the goals of feminism might be almost identical to those of a true equality movement when women are considerably disadvantaged, only to grow further and further apart as female disadvantages are removed or supplanted by new privileges, while male disadvantages remain or are increased and privileges removed, until, eventually, they are on opposing sides. Similarly, a classical liberal or a libertarian might have a considerable overlap with feminism in the original situation, only to end up on opposing sides as the situation changes.

Other potential examples include stretches of classical liberals and social-democrats or social-democrats and communists going hand-in-hand at various times and in various countries, as well as many other political cooperations or “common enemy”/“common goal” situations—even groups like vegetarians-for-health-reasons and vegetarians-for-animal-rights-reasons could conceivably be relevant. I am a little loath to be more specific and definite, because “fellow traveling”, in and by it self, does not automatically imply that the fallacy is present. To boot, even when the fallacy does occur, it will not necessarily affect the majority. (Feminism, in contrast, is an example where the fallacy is extremely common.)

As a sub-category of this fallacy, the temporary fellow travelers who fail to understand that later destinations will diverge, or who are apologetic for misbehavior by their current fellow travelers, are an ample source of “useful idiots”. (Feminism, again, provides many examples.) This becomes a great danger when apologeticism extends to methods, not just opinions, as when lies, censorship, or even violence is tolerated because “they are on our side”, “it helps our cause”, or similar, by someone who would condemn the exact same actions from a group that is not a current fellow traveler.

Another potential sub-category is those that identify some group as fellow travelers, fail to consider the fallacy, and then start to adopt opinions that they “should” have in order to conform further with the fellow travelers, leading themselves astray through committing a second fallacy. (Cf. parts of two older posts: [1], [2])


Written by michaeleriksson

June 9, 2018 at 6:47 am

Group characteristics vs. individual variation

with 4 comments

In various discussions, in particular with the PC crowd, I have found at least two recurring errors concerning groups vs. individuals that are worthy of discussion:

Firstly, a highly naive conclusion (based on a correct premise): Individual variation is often greater than group differences (correct); ergo, group differences are irrelevant (very wrong), of marginal importance (very wrong), or only discussed by those who are sexist, racist, or similar (extremely wrong—and, frankly, a misstep that I find hard to comprehend).

To take a recent example from a Swedish discussione (for technical reasons, the means, but not the place, of emphasis have been altered):

I princip alla fysiologiska och psykologiska egenskaper och talanger är normalfördelade i populationen. Om man väljer att skikta det statistiska materialet utifrån kön kommer man att finna att normalfördelningskurvorna ofta skiljer sig åt mellan könen, men man kommer också att finna att de individuella variationerna är större än variationerna mellan könen.
M.a.o.: det är korkat att hävda att män är si och kvinnor så. Lika korkat som att hävda att ”män är långa och kvinnor korta”.
Vill ni tillhöra den korkade skaran kan ni förstås fortsätta att argumentera på detta vis.

(In principle, all physiological and psychological characteristics and talents follow a normal-distribution in the population. If one chooses to compare [original phrasing slightly ambiguous and not translatable] based on sex, one will find that the [distributions] are often different between the sexes, but one will also find that the individual variations are greater than the variations between the sexes.
In other words: it is stupid to claim that men are this and women that. Just as stupid as claiming that “men are tall and women short”.
If you want to belong to the stupid flock, you can obviously continue to argument like this.)

(Note here the strawman of using an unusually strong polarization: The far more typical opinions and statements would be of the type “men are taller than women”. In more detail, the claim is not correct that all characteristics follow a normal-distribution; however, very many do follow a distribution with similar characteristics—at least close to the average.)

Now, why is this line of argumentation, at best, specious? Broadly speaking, even when individual variations are large, the group variations can have a very considerable effect on group outcomes. This applies in particular when we look at groups which are dominated by individuals who (wrt at least some characteristics) belong to the upper or lower end of the distributions. Consider professors of mathematics, convicts, Olympic athletes, … However, even in daily life, the effects can be large. I strongly recommend reading The Bell Curvew, which discusses how a great number of outcomes correlate with an implicit grouping by IQ and how groups (grouped by other criteria) with different average IQs have different outcomes. (Some of La Griffe du Lion’s writingse are also quite good—and available online.) Notably, the more equal opportunity is, the more important group characteristics become for group outcome.

An additional hitch is that not all differences are dominated by individual variation. Notably, the mere existence of special cases does not imply that individual variation is the greater factor. There are many characteristics where the difference between two groups is so large that the group difference dominates. Consider the attribute height and the groups of 5 respectively 10 y.o. children for an uncontroversial example.

Secondly, the equally naive conclusion (or evil strawman?) that those who claim that group X is Q also believe that all individual members of X are Q—or that those who claim that group X is more/less Q than group Y also believe that all individual members of X are more/less Q than all individual members of Y. There is nothing wrong with statements like “Men are taller than women.” or “Ashkenazi are intelligent.”—even if there are great individual variations: The speaker will almost certainly take the existence of exceptions for granted, assume that the reader is intelligent and informed enough to also take them for granted, and consider it a given that the statement refers to group characteristics that need not apply to any specific individual. (The rare exceptions will almost always be clear from context.)

As an aside, a principally different error with very similar consequences is to assume “all quantification” where “existence quantification” (or a middle step) was intended. During my readings of relationship forums a few years ago, e.g., I saw a great number of cases where a male poster wrote something which most likely was a “some”, on the outside a “most”, e.g. “Why do women like a-holes?”—only to be met with a barrage of “Stop generalizing! We are not all like that, you misogynist!”. The point is that an unspecified quantification is not necessarily an “all” (or even a “most”), that it is highly presumptuous to assume an “all” where it is not actually stated, and that great attention to the context must be paid before raising accusations.

Written by michaeleriksson

December 28, 2010 at 4:34 pm